Austrian Economics Forum: Donny with an A -

Unbelievable. To Caley, does that mean that the victims should automatically have to bear the entire burden of the self-benefiting actions of others? To mroctor, you might be interested in this.

Dee, why are you still here? The action's moved over to the somehow even more ideological Austrian Network! C'mon budday!

To say that an ethics requires logical validity is to say that an ethics is an argument. I'm not sure what kind of argument that would be... If you meant logical consistency, then I think that consistency is absolutely necessary. That's not to say that an ethics must be able to come up with pronouncements about every single possible thing, but you can't contradict yourself.

You seem to be more focused on universalizing principles, though. That it's wrong for some person to steal a car doesn't entail anything about anything besides that person, unless additional principles are adopted. For example, if we say that moral rules must apply to all individuals, no matter what their social role or circumstances, then it follows that if one person is prohibited from stealing, then all individuals are so prohibited. But such a principle is not required.

As for the tension between deontology and consequentialism, one focuses on the choices being made by the actor, and the other focuses on the consequences of the actor's choices. So if I'm deciding whether to tell a joke, I might apply a consequentialist principle that I should only tell it if it's funny. By the consequentialist paradigm, my choice to tell the joke will be evaluated as right or wrong by the reaction it gets from my friends. If they laugh, then I made the right choice; if they don't, then I made the wrong choice. Alternatively, I could apply a deontological principle that I should only tell it if I think it's funny, and worth telling. By this principle, the outcome is irrelevant in judging my action. If I tell a joke that I found funny, I do the right thing, even if no one laughs. And if I tell a joke that I think is stupid, then I violated my principle even if people laugh at the joke.

In practice, there isn't as much of a "dichotomy" as there might seem to be between these two views. A deontological theory would surely have to take outcomes into account when forming its principles for action, and a consequentialist view would surely need to take the capacities and circumstances of actors into account when leveling its judgments. Personally, I find deontological views more useful, since they help to guide action, but I would never dare to discount the importance of consequences in actually forming a deontological view.

I guess my objection was just that you said that an expectation of profit was the only logical reason to accept a system of ethics. I don't see how profit, as you're using it, is much of a reason at all. It's just part of the mechanics of choosing anything. Like: "Why do you choose that system of ethics?" "Because I have a preference for it which I am expressing through choosing it." Not very satisfying. And further, if you accept Mises' axiom of action, it's not just that any other reason would go against the subjectivity of value, it's that any reason incompatible with it would be literally impossible to apply. I'm just sort of unclear as to why you would say anything at all if that's all you were trying to say.

Grant, if you're defining profit that way, then you're saying that it's impossible for people to accept ethics for any reason besides an expectation of profit, aren't you?